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I. INTRODUCTION
Countries around the world are having a difficult time maintaining clean
water services for their citizens; indeed, one public interest group has
remarked that, "[a] worldwide crisis over water is brewing."' In response to
this worldwide crisis, international organizations have begun encouraging
developing countries to allow private entities to participate in providing
water services to the public, termed "privatization." 2 Privatization of water
services was discussed at the World Health Forum on Promoting the Human
Right to Water,3 and The International Monetary Fund made water
privatization a condition of both its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.4 Water privatization has been
difficult and fairly unsuccessful thus far; however, it has been pushed
through trade agreements and conditions on loans.5
After decades of difficulty with public water services, the Tanzanian
government chose to privatize its water services by permitting corporations
to bid on a water and sewage infrastructure project.6 A private corporation,
City Water, contracted with a public provider of water to enhance the
cleanliness and availability of water in Tanzania.7 Unfortunately, the water
privatization project was unsuccessful,8 and is an example of how
governments of developing countries are struggling with protecting their
1 Public Citizen, Water Privatization Overview, available at http://www.citizen.org/
cmep/Water/general/.
2 Zarina Geloo, Biwater vs Tanzania: Tears Flow Over Water Privatisation,
TERRAVIvA, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.ipsterraviva.net/tv/Nairobilen/
viewstory.asp?idnews=792.
34
4 Id
5 Dustin VanOverbeke, Water Privatization Conflicts, WATER Is LIFE (2004),
available at http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmazVANOVEDR/.
6 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (U.K.) v. United Republic of Tanzania, Award,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, para. 42 (July 24, 2008) [hereinafter Biwater
Award].
7 Id. at para. 43.
8 Id at para. 96.
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citizens' rights to clean water. A woman in Tanzania described her access to
water in 2008 through the Tanzanian privatization project:
The pressure was low so I had to install a pump just to get some ... We
get water without a pump at 5 or 6pm. Under [City Water Services] they
still bring the bills, even if no water ... Now sometimes the water is clean
and sometimes it is dirty so I boil the water.9
Other individuals in similar situations described their experiences as
having very little water every day, or only having access to water two days a
week, or after midnight.'10 This situation is the reality for many individuals in
developing countries currently experiencing water privatization. Because
international organizations have begun encouraging developing countries to
privatize water services, many see privatization as a symptom of
globalization. 1'
While globalization is affecting water privatization in developing
countries, it is also fostering exponential growth in the activity of
international tribunals. 12 Examples of this growth include: the forming of the
dispute mechanism at the World Trade Organization, "private rights of action
in the North American Free Trade Agreement," and the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, which was created pursuant to the first treaty
containing an intricate dispute settlement resolution mechanism.' 3 Indeed,
the last decade has been called the "golden age" for dispute resolution.14 As
the world moves into an increasingly integrated global system, the law must
adapt and change to meet the system's needs. International law has been the
traditional framework for the world to adapt to the new legal issues created
by globalization. 15 The cross-border legal framework is beginning to shift,
however, from a system of international law, governing the interaction of
states, to a system of transnational laws and norms governing the interaction
9 GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE SAGA OF AN AFRICAN CITY, A UK COMPANY, THE
WORLD BANK AND A POP SONG, WORLD DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT 8 (2008) (on file
with author).
10 Id
11See Press Release, Public Citizen, Public Citizen Report Reveals World Bank
Loans Continue to Promote Water Privatization (Apr. 22, 2004), http://www.citizen.org/
pressroomlrelease.cfln?LD= 1695.
12 Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms:
The Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 685, 685 (2007).
13 Id
14 Id at 686.
15 Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and
the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT'L & COME. L. REv. 235, 235-
36 (2002).
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between states and other entities such as corporations and non-governmental
organizations.'16
Traditionally in the United States, federal environmental laws have
governed according to medium such as air, water, and waste. For example,
The Clean Water Act is the primary mechanism for ensuring clean drinking
water in the United States.' 7 New governance theories of environmental law
posit, however, that a medium-based framework is perhaps not the most
effective for environmental law. 18 New governance theorists argue instead
for the harnessing of cross-border networks through a system that maintains a
flexible structure of regulation, allowing environmental law to adapt to
changes in science and technology.'19
This Note seeks to explore the interaction of two possibly competing
systems: the international investment arbitration mechanism and the new face
of environmental regulation based on new governance theories. The
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC SID")
arbitration mechanism has been changed to allow a limited right of public
participation through the submission of amicus briefs, according to a new
Rule governing ICSID arbitrations.20 Similarly, the new U.S. Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty now includes a provision relating to public participation in
arbitration.21 The changes in ICSID toward greater transparency and
engagement of the public have perhaps helped states defend expropriation
challenges when the state is seeking to protect the health and safety of its
citizens' drinking water.
This Note will explore two ICSID arbitrations involving water regulation
and the submission of amicus briefs: Methanex Corp. v. United StateS22 and
16 Borgen, supra note 12, at 686. Transnational law, for the purposes of this Note,
means a legal system governing the relations between a foreign private party and a state.
Transnational law is "[t]he amalgam of common principles of domestic and international
law dealing esp. with problems arising from agreements made between sovereign states
and foreign private parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (9th ed. 2004).
17 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-387 (2006).
18 Orly Label, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342,351-52 (2004).
19 AN-M"AnJ SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 5 (2004).
20 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Rule 37(2) (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes Apr. 2006) [hereinafter ICSID Convention Rules].
21 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. Dep't of State & Office of
the U.S. Trade Rep. (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
11760 1.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT] art. 28(3): ("The tribunal shall have the
authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is
not a disputing party.").
22 In the Matter of an International Arbitration Under Chapter 11I of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Between
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Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) v. The United Republic of Tanzania.23 Both cases
involve a foreign investor challenging a state's action as an expropriation, or
taking, of their investment. This Note explores the difference between the
two cases in light of new governance theories of regulation and the
procedural improvements in ICSID arbitration. The changes in bilateral
investment treaties and ICSID3 are likely to protect states against
expropriation challenges made to traditional regulations. This student argues,
however, that expropriation challenges will remain in place as new
governance theories of regulation percolate into the frameworks of both
domestic and international law. The actions taken by The Republic of
Tanzania regarding the regulation of water, culminating in the expropriation
challenge, are an example of new governance theories at work. This Note
will explore the process and reasoning of the ICSID tribunal involving the
challenge to Tanzania's new governance action and examine whether the
recent improvements in ICSIiD arbitration equipped the Tribunal with tools to
fairly arbitrate the action.
Part II of this Note explains the current scholarship on shifting forms of
regulation, from traditional regulation to new governance. Part III describes
the current state of international law and the transnational arbitration
mechanism. Part IV examines two investor-state arbitrations that have
allowed public participation-the first arbitration to allow public
participation, Methanex, and a very recent case doing so, Biwater. Part V
examines the arbitrations in light of new governance theories and the
procedural improvements in transnational arbitration. Part V concludes by
exploring how the Biwater tribunal implemented the right of public
participation in transnational arbitration, and how the right may be harnessed
and expanded in the future to adapt to the changing transnational world
order.
IL. WHAT is NEW GOVERNANCE?
New governance theories have evolved as a shift from the theory
focusing on the creation of the regulatory state developed during the New
Deal.2 4 The federal government worked toward achieving the goals of the
Methanex Corporation and United States of America, Final Award (Aug. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputesus-6.htm (scroll down to select "Final
Award, 9 August 2005").
23 Biwater Award, supra note 6.
24 Lobel, supra note 18, at 35 1-52. This Note combines "new governance" theories
into one category for the purposes of examining the implementations of the larger theory
in the context of transnational arbitration. New governance theories in reality are
innumerable and distinctive and include "reflexive law, soft law, collaborative
governance, democratic experimentalism, responsive regulation, outsourcing regulation,
20101 345
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New Deal--"relief, recovery and reform"'-by creating heavy administrative
regulation. 25 The paradigmatic shift initiated during the New Deal involved
increased reliance on experts and the creation of centralized regulatory
agencies that initiated "top-down" policies. 26 "The central proposition of the
New Deal regulatory model was that a few well-educated, specially trained,
and publicly appointed professionals could make the best decisions about
national policies."127 The New Deal led to the vast expansion of the
administrative state and deference to agency expertise. 28
In environmental law, debates over the proper type of regulation have
traditionally centered around who should regulate-usually in the context of
federal versus state regulation-and whether a market-based or "command
and control" approach was more suitable. 29 Federal environmental laws have
been the subject of several commerce clause challenges in the United States,
as Congress's regulation of water, air, and endangered species is difficult to
fit into traditional commerce clause jurisprudence. 30 Federal environmental
laws in the United States have traditionally been separated by medium. 3' The
Clean Water Act, for example, makes the addition of a pollutant from a point
source into navigable waters illegal;32 and the Clean Air Act allows the EPA
to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for air quality safety. 33 From
this style of regulation by medium, environmental regulators have shifted
toward implementing regional programs that encourage private actors to
participate in the regulatory process in addition to governments. 34 This shift
reconstitutive law, post-regulatory law, revitalizing regulation, regulatory pluralism,
decentering regulation, meta-regulation, contractarian law, communicative governance,
negotiated governance, destabilization rights, cooperative implementation, interactive
compliance, public laboratories, deepened democracy and empowered participatory
governance, pragmatic lawyering, nonnival partnership, and a daring legal system." Id at
346-47 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
25 Id at 351-52.
2 6 Id. at 37 1.
27 Id.
2 8 Id. at 373.
29 Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 795, 797 (2005).
30 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 724 (2006); Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175 (2001); Gibbs v. Babbit, 214
F.3d 483, 489 (4th Cir. 2000).
31 Eg., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 125 1-387 (2006).
32 Id §§ 1311, 1362.
33 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006).
34 Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and
Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVrL. L. 1239, 1241 (2008).
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has been termed "new governance." 35 Two examples of new governance
projects include the Chesapeake Bay Program and the Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands.36
New governance challenges the idea of the super regulatory state and
focuses on stakeholder participation-at all levels of government, citizen
groups, and industry-in regulatory action and integrating top-down and
bottom-up policies. 37 New legal theories relating specifically to
environmental law posit that the federal versus state and "command and
control" versus market-based distinctions oversimplify the complexities of
regulating the environment. 38 Scholars now generally accept the proposition
that environmental law must remain flexible in order to adapt to scientific
changes in ecosystems that are constantly in flux. 39 New governance
theorists argue that the way to facilitate this adaptive system is to engage
multiple stakeholders, with differing views and types of expertise, when
formulating policies. 40 In this collaborative system, individuals and
industries that were once the subject of regulation are now participants in the
process, engaging in dialogue and information sharing.4'
New governance scholarship in recent years has focused on the increase
in private actors-both non-profit and for profit-in domestic and
international law; indeed, many commentators suggest that these actors now
35 Id
36M at 1265. The Chesapeake Bay program focuses on the preservation of blue
crab in the Bay. The program took into account the concerns of Chesapeake Bay
residents, as the Bay and the blue crab in it are a source of pride for the residents, making
it an example of new governance. The Ramnsar Convention on Wetlands has been hailed
as a "model of innovation" because it engages both the Secretariat and member states,
and has the ability to respond in the face of ecological changes. Id at 1266.
37 Lobel, supra note 18, at 373.
38 Freeman & Farber, supra note 29, at 797-98. ("It seems increasingly indisputable,
after decades of environmental regulation and management, that success with every
environmental problem, including habitat conservation, air pollution control, water
allocation, hazardous waste remediation, and wetlands restoration, requires not only a
suite of complementary regulatory tools and the coordination of multiple levels of
government, but also a wide variety of informal implementation mechanisms and the
ongoing participation of key stakeholders.").
39 Wiersema, supra note 34, at 1249. Professor Wiersema challenges, however, that
before we completely accept the new governance procedural theories of current scholars,
we reassess the need for substantive changes in the form of concrete goals in
environmental law. "[I]n order to ensure that the train does not fall off its tracks, these
goals should be entrenched into law with attributes of certainty and predictability." Id at
1299.
40 Lobel, supra note 18, at 374.
41 Id
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play a critical role. 42 Not only do private actors have a role as participants in
the negotiation of new projects, they also have a role in implementing those
projects. One segment of new governance theories focuses on sharing the
government's involvement in activities traditionally considered under its
domain with the involvement of private industry.43 Implementation sharing
creates interaction between the private and public sector and also "leads to
fluid and permeable boundaries" between the two.44
On the international plane and in the context of a stewardship model,
Anne-Marie Slaughter describes the role of governments in a "new world
order" as that of disaggregated actors.45 Stewardship is a theory
substantiating a government's right to protect the environment through the
proposition that all governments and citizens have a duty to maintain the
earth for themselves and protect it for future generations. 46 The old model of
international law rests on the idea that each state is a unified entity with
international law creating relationships and intergovernmental organizations
between states.47 The globalized world creates the need for more law to
govern the exponential number of global interactions, yet a centralized world
government is a proposition that most fear; Slaughter describes this as the
"globalization paradox." 48 Slaughter's solution is for government entities, as
disaggregated actors, to form cross-border networks.
The role of different state actors, she argues, should be seen as forming
networks with other state actors across borders. This can lead to a system of
"global governance" without the problematic centralized world
42 E.g., Freeman & Farber, supra note 29, at 803.
43 Lobel, supra note 18, at 374.
441Id.
45 SLAUGHTER, supra note 19, at 5 ("Start thinking about a world of governments,
with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governments-
legislation, adjudication, implementation-interacting both with each other domestically
and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts.").
46 This model has received little recognition from legal scholars in the United States.
GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENviRoNmENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 25 (5th ed. 2007).
One state court that has accepted the theory wrote, "[T]he clear policy underlying Florida
environmental regulation is that our society is to be the steward of the natural world, not
its unreasoning overlord." Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 932 (Fla.
1995).
47 SLAUGHTER, supra note 19, at 12. This is similar to the concept of a person
colloquially describing "the government." The individual knows that the government is
made up of many different moving parts, for example, Congress, the judiciary, and
executive agencies. The individual still describes "the government," however, as a
generic disembodied entity; Slaughter challenges this paradigm. Id at 4.
4 8 Id. at 8_-10.
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government. 49 These networks may be both vertical-such as the interaction
between Member States and the European Union-and horizontal. Slaughter
argues that there is a "blind spot" in the international system: the fact that
smaller government units on their own are not recognized as having an
international role.50 These networks of smaller governmental bodies have
been forming for many years; yet, international law has not recognized the
disaggregated networks for what they are.51 One example of this idea is the
environmental enforcement network formed by the three NAFTA countries,
the United States, Mexico and Canada, which has "enhanced the
effectiveness of environmental regulation in all three states ...15
Currently, governments have tapped into foreign networking by
engaging in "regulatory export."153 For example, as of 2004, the EPA offered
over twenty courses to foreign countries, instructing them in how to enforce
their environmental laws or run their counterpart agencies.54 Essentially,
these trainings teach states how to model their environmental regulations
after those of the United States and share technologies developed by United
States firms in complying with environmental law, hence the term
"4regulatory export."155 In contrast to teaching other states how to model their
regulation after the United States, Slaughter argues that the role of each state
should be to set the problem solving process in motion and then allow other
stakeholders to work out the solution. 56 This will lead states to discover new
"parallel networks" that will create cross-border information sharing beyond
mere regulatory export.57
49 Slaughter describes the problem of global governance as a "tni-lemma." A
centralized, powerful world government would place too much power in the hands of one
entity. However, without such a system there is little room for accountability on the part
of people making decisions. Id. at 10.
5 0 Id at 33.
5 1 Id at 14.
52 SLAUGHTER, supra note 19, at 2.
53 Id. at 172 (quoting Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
32-33 (2002)).
54 Id at 173.
55 Id.
5 6 Id at 193.
57 SLAUGHTER, supra note 19, at 194. Slaughter warns that these sorts of practices
will need constant evolution. Id.
20101 349
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III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS: LAW AND THE ARBITRATION
MECHANISM
A. The Legal Bases of International Investment Law and Bilateral
Investment Treaties
Developing the appropriate legal balance between states and foreign
investors in the realm of investment disputes was difficult initially because:
(1) investors are neither protected by the laws of the host-state nor are
investors the subject of public international law, and (2) a state's breach of a
contract between itself and a foreign investor is unlikely to rise to the level of
a violation of international law.58 In response to these difficulties, states
began entering into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which is an
agreement between two states containing provisions designed to protect
foreign investors. 59 BITs "form a bridge" between private investors and host-
states by providing investors with protection when investing in a foreign state
that they would not otherwise receive under international law.60 The legal
protection for the investor falls under the law of the host-state; however, the
law of the host-state must conform to the host-state and investor-state BIT.61
Many BITs were initially entered into between developed and developing
countries.62 In recent years, however, developing countries have signed BITs
among themselves and with developed countries.63
BITs contain several provisions, including definitions of "investor" and
"investment," an agreement as to how disputes will be settled, and the
standard of treatment the foreign investor will receive.64 BITs often lack an
58 SURyA p. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INvEsTmENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 135 (2008); see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment
Treaty Arbit rat ion: Privatizing Public International Low Through Inconsistent Decisions,
73 FoRwIi)i~ L. REv. 1521, 1537 (2005).
59 SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 135.
60 Id
61 Id at 83.
62 Id
63 Franck, supra note 58, at 1527. Many important investment treaty cases are
arbitrated because of a dispute arising under a regional trade agreement, such as NAFTA
or CAFTA. These regional trade agreements are, of course, not bilateral investment
treaties, but they contain similar expropriation provisions, discussed below. See infra
Part III.B. NAFTA Section 1102 is the provision under which Methanex Corp. v. United
States was arbitrated.
64 SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 84. A threshold issue that must be decided before a
foreign party and host-state may submit a dispute to arbitration is whether the dispute
involves a transaction that rises to the legal definition of "investment." Franck, supra
350 Vol. 71:2
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enumeration of the principles of law that will be used in the event that
arbitration is necessary to settle a dispute.65 Of the BITs that do define which
principles of law will govern the arbitration of a dispute, most use phrases
such as "generally recognised rules and principles of international law."16 6
International investment law relies mainly on principles of customary
international law,67 including the principles of state responsibility and fair
and equitable treatment. 68 The latter principle prohibits states that have some
sort of agreement with the investor's state-usually a BIT, a fair trade
agreement, or a WTO agreement-from discriminating against a foreign
investor in contravention of that agreement. 69 BITs are remarkable because
they create substantive rights for the foreign investor and because they offer
foreign investors a remedy for the denial of those rights. 70 Investment treaties
play an important role for investors both in choosing where to invest and in
determining how to structure the investment.71 The 2004 United States
Model BIT contains a provision stipulating that if an investment dispute must
go to arbitration, the arbitration of the dispute should involve public
participation.72
B. Expropriation Principles
The principle that has received the most attention and been the subject of
most controversies regarding international investment is expropriation.73
note 58, at 1533. Because the Convention does not define the term, BITs will usually
contain definitions of both "investor" and "investment."
65 SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 102.
66 Id.
67 Customary international law is "in most cases [] regarded as general law which
countries may codify, specify, or derogate from through treaties." Ole Kristian Fauchald,
The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals-An Empirical Analysis, 19 EuR. J. INT'L L.
301, 324 (2008).
68 SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 56. The state responsibility principle is contained in the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Article One
of this document states: "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the
international responsibility of that State." Id at 56 n.2 (quoting INT'L LAW CoMM'N,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, para. 76, U.N. Doc. A/56/ 10 (Nov. 2001)).
69 Id. at 75.
70 Franck, supra note 58, at 1529.
71 Id. at 1525.
72 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, art. 28(3) ("The tribunal shall have the authority
to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a
disputing party.").
73 SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 74.
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Expropriation is a "centuries-old principle of foreign investment law" that
prohibits a country from expropriating--or taking-a foreign investment
unless certain conditions are met.7 4 in order for a state to have the right to
expropriate a foreign investment: (1) the expropriation must be for a public
purpose, (2) the expropriation must be non-discriminatory, (3) the investment
must be expropriated in accordance with ''applicable laws and due process"~
and (4) full compensation must be paid.75 Discriminatory takings, the second
condition listed above, involve the investor claiming that the host-state is
treating the investor, as a foreign entity, differently than domestic investors.
There are different standards for the level of treatment that should be
afforded to a foreign investor.76 For example, the "like circumstances"
standard requires a host-state to treat an investor the same as other investors
in "like circumstances."177 When a situation meets the four conditions that
allow expropriation, the state must compensate the investor.78
There are two types of expropriation: direct and indirect.79 Direct
expropriation constitutes the actual taking of property by the government;
this is the simpler and less controversial form of expropriation. 80 Indirect
expropriation can come in several forms, such as creeping expropriation or
regulatory expropriation. 81 Creeping expropriation involves the host
government taking actions that generally decrease the value of the
74 Id.
75 Id. International law scholars have debated the precise meaning and contours of
each of these conditions. Indeed, Subedi notes, "questions such as what constitutes an
expropriation; what is a 'public purpose'; what constitutes discrimination; and what is
meant by full compensation have been the matter of acute controversy. .. ." Id. For
example, Higgins describes the "public purpose principle" as "a means of differentiating
takings for purely private gain on the part of the ruler from those for reasons related to
the economic preferences of the country concerned." Id. at 75 (quoting Rosyln Higgins,
The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law, in 176
REcUE1L DES Couas 259, 371 (Hague Acad. of Int'l Law 1982)).
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1102(1),
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] ("Each Party shall accord to
investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.").
78 SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 74. The amount of compensation is another aspect of
expropriation law that has received a great amount of attention from commentators and
has been the subject of much jurisprudence. Id
7 9 Id at 75.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 76-77.
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investment, while regulatory expropriation involves a challenge to a measure
taken by a host-state when the measure can have the effect of reducing the
economic value of the asset owned.82
The 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes language indicating that a state has a
right to enact environmental regulations-and thus that the regulations
should not be the subject of an expropriation action-in order to
(1) "compl~y] with [other] laws [or obligations] and regulations," (2) "protect
human, animal, or plant life or health," and (3) conserve "living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources." 83 Such action should not be considered an
expropriation of an investment as long as the action is not "applied in an
arbitrary or unjustifiable manner" and "do[es] not constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade or investment."184 These provisions are,
however, simply part of the draft BIT for the United States and are thus only
the starting point for negotiating new BITs.
C. The Arbitration Mechanism: ICSID and Procedural Improvements
1. Procedures for Arbitrating Investment Disputes
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
was organized by the World Bank specifically to address the problem of
foreign investors obliged to bring a claim arising out of a legal dispute
regarding their investment in a host-state's domestic court.85 Forcing
litigation in a host-state's domestic court subjected the investor to the
uncertainty of the state's domestic political system and thus discouraged
foreign investment. 86 Investment treaty arbitration has greatly increased in
the last six or seven years, and transnational investment tribunals are now
flooded with arbitrations. 87 Professor Susan Franck notes that the shift to
83 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, art. 8(3)(c); see also id. art. 12(2) ("Nothing in
this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing
any measure otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure
that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns.").
84 Id art. 8(3)(c).
85 SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 30.
8 6 Id The legal bases of international investment law may come from one of seven
sources: (1) the ICSID Convention, (2) multilateral investment treaties such as NAFTA,
(3) bilateral investment treaties, (4) customary international law, (5) general principles of
law, (6) agreements between the parties or decisions by the parties and (7) domestic
legislation. Fauchald, supra note 67, at 303.
87 Franck, supra note 58, at 1538-39.
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investment treaty arbitration is remarkable because the arbitration
mechanism allows investors to act as "private attorney generals," and "places
the enforcement of public international law rights into the hands of private
individuals and corporations" 88
ICSID is merely one arbitration system that may be convened to resolve
international investment disputes arising out of an alleged breach of a
bilateral investment treaty. In general, investment treaties usually offer
investors a choice of resolving a dispute through arbitration or a court
system; the treaties also give investors the choice of which arbitration system
will govern the dispute.89 In addition to ICSID, organized under the auspices
of the World Bank, investors may have the choice of bringing a dispute
under the rules of several other arbitral tribunals, including the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), or the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce ("SCC").90 The process of initiating an investment dispute begins
with the foreign investor determining whether it has standing to pursue
arbitration under the relevant treaty. 91 After the arbitration is initiated,92 the
parties appoint an arbitral tribunal, usually consisting of three arbitrators,
with one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third arbitrator appointed
according to the consensus of the first two appointees.93 The procedure the
tribunal follows during the arbitration depends on the specific claim involved
and the rules chosen to govern the dispute.94
ICSID grants parties the right to file arbitration disputes at their facilities
in light of a legal dispute between a host-state and foreign investor.95
Article 25(1) of the ICS1D Convention grants the tribunal jurisdiction over
the claim as long as both parties consent to the arbitration.96 In order to
88 Id. at 1538.
89 Id. at 154 1.
90Id
91 Id. at 1542.
92 This initiation process normnally involves: "(1) submitting a notice of dispute to
the Sovereign, (2) complying with the applicable waiting period, (3) electing where to
resolve the dispute, and (4) taking the chosen procedure forward in accordance with the
chosen mechanisms articulated in the investment treaty." Id. at 1543.
93 Franck, supra note 58, at 1543-44.
94 Id, at 1543.
95 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 1(2), approved Mar. 18, 1965, 17.1 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
96 1d art. 25(1) ("T'he jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a
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arbitrate a dispute at ICSID, therefore, the parties to the dispute must be
parties to the ICSID Convention. As of March of 2010, there were 155
parties to the ICSID Convention. 97 Commentators have hailed ICSILD as the
new frontier in investor-state dispute resolution because the purpose in
drafting the ICSID Convention was to "balance the interests of both private
investors and States," and it has been generally recognized as accomplishing
that goal. 98 Transnational investment tribunals, because they are modeled
after commercial tribunals, have traditionally maintained "strong
presumptions of confidentiality." 99
2. Challenges to the Lack of Transparency in Investment Treaty
Arbitration and Procedural Improvements in ICSID
Investor-state arbitration has traditionally been opaque: only parties to
the dispute were allowed to participate in the decision, the documents
concerning the arbitration remained confidential, and the decisions of
tribunals have not been consistently published.' 00 Commentators have
vehemently criticized this opaqueness because the opaqueness has
traditionally remained even when an investor challenges action taken by a
host-state that the host-state considers to be in the public interest.101
Commentators argue that the investor-state arbitration mechanism should
engage the public interest by allowing the participation of ami~cus curiae and
that investor-state mechanisms should allow non-disputing parties--or
amici-access to documents involving the arbitration so the amici may file a
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may
withdraw its consent unilaterally.").
97~ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
http://icsid.worldbank.orgl (follow "Member States" hyperlink) (last visited March 10,
2010).
98 Sandra L. Caruba, Resolving International Investment Disputes in a Globalized
World, 13 N.Z Bus. L.Q. 128, 141 (2007).
99 Franck, supra note 58, at 1544.
10I.at 1544-45.
101 See Caruba, supra note 98, at 148; Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public
Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the
Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 784-87 (2008); Franck, supra
note 58, at 1545; J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of
Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52
MCGILL L.J. 681, 681 (2007); Kara Dougherty, Note, Methanex v. United States. The
Realignment of NAFTA Chapter I11 with Environmental Regulation, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 735, 752 (2007).
20101 355
356 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
useful brief.10 2 Describing the suggestions made by commentators to increase
the legitimacy of the investment arbitration process, Professor Franck
identified two ideas as having potential: (1) the amendment of the arbitration
rules to allow the consideration of non-disputing parties and (2) the
amendment of bilateral investment treaties to recognize public participation
and the publication of decisions. 103 Both of Professor Franck's suggestions
have been implemented: first, by the amendment of the ICSID Rules to allow
non-disputing parties to participate in certain arbitrations at the discretion of
the relevant tribunal, and second, by the 2004 U.S. Model BIT provisions
providing that decisions should be public and non-disputing parties may be
allowed to participate in the case when it involves the public interest.' 04
The ICSID Convention Rules were amended in 2006 to allow the
participation of non-disputing parties at the discretion of the Tribunal when:
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from
that of the disputing parties;
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within
the scope of the dispute;
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the
proceeding.'105
Rule 3 7(2) also requires the Tribunal to consult both parties before
allowing the submission of amicus briefs by non-disputing parties and states
that the Tribunal should not allow submissions if they would unfairly
prejudice either of the parties.' 06 The final sentence of Rule 37 states: "The
Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not
disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party,
and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their observations on
the non-disputing party submission."' 0 7
The case studies below explore two investment treaty arbitrations. The
first case study explores Methanex Corp. v. United States, an arbitration
allowing the submission of amicus briefs under NALFTA Chapter 11I where
the dispute was arbitrated according to the UNCITRAL Rules. The second
102 See, e.g., VanDuzer, supra note 101, at 708.
103 Franck, supra note 58, at 1602-04, 1616-17.
104 See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, arts. 11(2), 28(3); ICSLD Convention Rules,
supra note 20, Rule 37(2).
105 ICSID Convention Rules. supra note 20. Rule 37(2).
106 Id
107 Id
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case study explores Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, a very recent case
allowing the submission of amicus briefs where a dispute was brought under
a bilateral investment treaty, and arbitrated according to the ICSID rules,
with Rule 37(2) as the basis for the submission of the amicus briefs. This
Note explores these case studies with three objectives in mind. First, this
Note analyzes the nature of the state action in each case that was subject to
the expropriation challenge in light of whether the state action taken is an
example of traditional state regulation or new governance regulation. Second,
this Note compares the procedural awards granting the non-disputing parties
the right to file the briefs and the arguments made in the briefs themselves.
The goal here is to understand how non-disputing parties are currently
harnessing their right to participate in transnational investment arbitration.
Finally, this Note looks to the potential brought by Rule 37(2) and the new
provisions in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT for harnessing and expanding the
right of NGOs to participate in investment treaty arbitration, and how the
new governance model can contribute to that expansion.
IV. CASE STUDIES: METHANEX CoRP. v. UNITED STA TES AND) BiWA TER
GAUFFLTD. v. TANZANIA
A. The State Regulations and Actions Challenged by the Investors as
Expropriation
In Methanex Corp. v. United States, a Canadian producer of methanol
brought a claim against the United States for expropriation pursuant to
NAFTA Chapter 11.108 The claim was brought under Articles 1116(1)
and 11 17(1) of NAFTA; as amended, the complaint alleged breaches of
Articles 1102, 1105 and 11I10 of NAFTA. 109 Methanex's challenge was to a
newly passed California law-the MTBE Public Health and Environment
Protection Act of 1997--outlawing the use of methyl tertiary butyl ether
(MTBE), an oxygenate additive in gasoline."10 The Methanex claim was
brought in 1999 and the final award was rendered in 2005.111
108 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction
and Merits pt. 1, Preface, para. 1, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1345 (NAF'rA Ch. I11 Arb. Trib. 2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf [hereinafter
Methanex Final Award].
109 Methanex Final Award, supra note 108, pt. I, Preface, at paras. 2, 4.
110 Dougherty, supra note 101, at 736 ("Gasoline manufacturers began using MTBE
in 1979 as a source of octane as lead was phased out of gasoline and, more recently, as an
oxygenate to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.").
111 Id. at 740.
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After researchers issued a study finding that MTBE was dangerous in
drinking water, Governor Gray Davis issued an executive order to phase out
the use of MTBE as a gasoline additive in California."12 The California
legislature endorsed this executive order through Senate Bill 989."13
Methanex was a Canadian manufacturer of methanol, the primary ingredient
in MTBE. It argued that the United States was discriminating against it in
passing the California law.' "14 Methanex's theory was that the MTBE Public
Health and Environment Protection Act of 1997 expropriated its investment
because California was intending to use ethanol instead of MTBE as a
gasoline additive."15 Ethanol producers in the United States were receiving
more favorable treatment than Methanex, the company argued, because
California was treating Methanex differently than it was treating ethanol
producers, and ethanol producers were in "like circumstances" with
Methanex." 6 Methanex Corp. v. United States represents the first case
brought by an investor challenging an environmental regulation passed by
the United States. 117 Methanex is an example of "regulatory expropriation"
because the corporation challenged a traditional regulation passed by "old
governance" theories.
The other case studied here, Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of
Tanzania, was more complicated. To summarize, Biwater involved a water
and sewage infrastructure project in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 118 Biwater
Gauff was an investment vehicle established in England and Wales; the
investment vehicle then established a company in Tanzania, City Water
Services Limited (City Water). 119 City Water contracted with a public
corporation in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority
(DAWASA), for the implementation of the sewage infrastructure project.120
The two contracting parties, City Water and DAWASA, had a dispute and
City Water decided to ask for arbitration.' 2 ' After City Water initiated
arbitration procedures, the Tanzanian government deported several members
11 dat 739.
113Id
114 Id at 740.
"15 Id at 749.
116 Dougherty, supra note 10 1, at 749.
1'7 id at 740.
'
1 8 Martna Polasek, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania,
Introductory Note to Three Procedural Orders, ICSLD Case No. ARIB/05/22, 22 ICSID
REv.-FoREI3N INvEsTmENTf L.J. 149, 149 (2007).
''9 Id
120 Id.
121 Id. at 149-50.
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of City Water's senior management.' 22 DAWASA and the Republic of
Tanzania seized City Water's assets 123 Biwater then submitted a claim
requesting arbitration under the ICSLD rules, invoking the bilateral
investment treaty between the United Kingdom and the United Republic of
Tanzania.' 24 The case involved a claim of roughly $20 million.' 25
The details of the case were quite complicated. The Republic of Tanzania
was initially awarded $140 million in World Bank, African Development
Bank, and European Investment Bank funding to increase infrastructure for
its water and sewage project. 126 Tanzania accepted bids for the project, called
the "Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project."' 27 Two
corporations submitted a joint bid: Biwater International Limited,
incorporated under English and Welsh law, and BP Gauff Lngenieure, a
German corporation.' 28 The two corporations then incorporated Biwater
Gauff for the purposes of the Dar es Salaam water and sewage project.' 29
Under the terms of the bid, the party winning the bid was required to create a
local Tanzanian operating company and a minimum number of shares in the
local company were to be held by either a Tanzanian company or a
Tanzanian individual.' 30 The local Tanzanian company incorporated by
Biwater Gauff was City Water. 13 ' City Water contracted with DAWASA, a
Tanzanian public corporation, to implement the project.' 32
There were three contracts entered into by the operating company: (1)
the Water and Sewerage Lease Contract, (2) the Supply and Installation of
Plant and Equipment Contract and (3) the Contract for the Procurement of
Goods.133 The lease contract, which the Tribunal noted was the most
important of the three, provided that City Water would provide water and
sewage services on behalf of DAWASA, and City Water would implement
certain aspects of the project.'34 DAWASA handed over all of its "day-to-
122 Id at 150.
123 Id
124 Polasek, supra note 118, at 150.
125 Id
126 Biwater Award, supra note 6, at para. 3.
128 Id at para. 4.
130Id at para. 5.
131 Id
132 Polasek, supra note 118, at 149.
133 Biwater Award, supra note 6, at para. 6.
14I.at para. 9.
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day activities" to City Water, and City Water was then in charge of providing
services to the designated areas in and around Dar es Salaam. 13 5
At the time the parties entered the lease contract, the water situation in
Dar es Salaam was "precarious," according to the World Bank.136 "Poor
management, lack of resources, increased demand and insufficient capital
expenditures over a period of decades had led to a progressive worsening of
the situation."137 The power to regulate water in Tanzania had been formally
granted to the National Urban Water Authority, a public entity that provided
water free of charge.' 38 Because of the poor state of water services, the
Tanzanian government sought to reform its policies regarding water services
through decentralization beginning in the 1990s.139 DAWASA had been in
charge of providing water services to the citizens of Dar es Salaam as a
decentralized regional entity, but had not succeeded in providing services as
the "existing infrastructure proved to be insufficient to do so."140 Involving a
private actor, Biwater Gauff, in the project bidding and implementation was a
"keystone of the reform process."141
Unfortunately, the private stakeholders in this action failed to implement
the project successfully. City Water was not successful in providing water
and sewage services to the people of Dar es Salaam because the project
proved too ambitious. In response to the failure of City Water to provide
services, the Tanzanian government initiated a series of actions culminating
in a notice to terminate the lease contract, the seizure of City Water's assets,
and the deportation of City Water's management.' 42 Biwater Gauff
challenged these events as an expropriation under the BIT between the
United Kingdom and Tanzania on the ground that Tanzania breached several
135 Id
16I.at para. 96.
137 Id.
13 8 Id at para. 98.
139 Biwater Award, supra note 6, at para. 97.
10I.at para. 8.
141 Id at para. 97.
142 Id. at para. 15. The events leading up to the seizure of assets and the deportation
of City Water officials were: (1) on May 13, 2005, the Minister of Water and Livestock
Development sought to terminate the lease contract, (2) on May 16 2005, "a call was
made on the entire amount of the performance bond established by City Water in
connection with the lease contract," (3) on May 17, 2005, "DAWASA issued a notice for
a reinstatement of the performance bond," and (4) on May 24, 2005, the Tanzania
Revenue Authority withdrew City Water's VAT exemption. Id The notice to terminate
the lease was issued on May 25, 2005, and the Tanzanian government seized City
Water's assets and deported City Water's senior management on June 1, 2005. Id
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of its obligations.143 Biwater argued that Tanzania had breached "its
obligations to grant fair and equitable treatment, not to take unreasonable and
discriminatory measures, the obligation to grant full protection and security
to investors and to guarantee the unrestricted transfer of funds."144
B. The Procedural Orders Allowing for Public Participation and the
Amicus Briefs
1. The Procedural Order in Methanex Corp. v. United States
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD),
Communities for a Better Environment, Bluewater Network, and the Center
For International Environmental Law (CIEL) sought permission to intervene
as amicus curiae in Methanex Corp. v. United States. 145 The Tribunal would
have jurisdiction to allow the submission of briefs, according to the amici, or
petitioners, under Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules.146 Article 15(1) of the
UNCITRAL Rules grants a tribunal arbitrating a dispute according to its
rules the broad procedural discretion to conduct the arbitration in a manner
the tribunal sees fit.147 IISD argued that it should have the right to intervene
in Methanex because of the public importance of the decision the Tribunal
would render in the case, the "critical impact" the Tribunal's decision would
have on public welfare in the United States, and because the participation of
the petitioners would help allay the public outcry over the investor's
challenge to the California law. 148 IISD also noted that the absence of an
appellate mechanism for the consideration of the Tribunal's decision
enhanced the importance of the public participation. 149 The other
143 Id. at para. 16.
144 Id.
145 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from
Third Persons to Intervene as Amicus Curiae, para. 5 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2004)
[hereinafter Methanex Amicus Decision].
146 Id. at para. 5.
147 Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, at Art. 15(1), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc.
A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNICTRAL Rules], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/1 976Arbitrationrules.html.
The full text of Article 15(1) states: "Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the
parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is
given a full opportunity of presenting his case." Id.
148 Methanex Amicus Decision, supra note 145, at para. 5.
149 Id. at para. 6.
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petitioners--Communities for a Better Environment, Bluewater Network,
and the Center for International Environmental Law-stressed that their
ability to participate was crucial because of the public support for the
intervention and the fact that the outcome of the arbitration would affect the
willingness of states to pass environmental regulation.' 50
The two NAFTA countries that were not parties to the dispute, Canada
and Mexico, submitted arguments to the Tribunal on whether the Tribunal
should consider the amicus submissions; Canada essentially paralleled the
arguments of the United States, while Mexico fell in line with the claimant-
investor, Methanex.15 1 Methanex argued that NAFTA's provisions required
documents prepared in anticipation of arbitration be kept confidential and
that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to allow the petitioners to intervene.152
There were two other dangers noted by Methanex here: first, that the
disputing parties would not have the opportunity to test the factual bases of
the non-disputing parties' submissions and second, that allowing the
submission in this case would set a damaging precedent to investors seeking
to resolve transnational disputes by arbitration.'153
The United States, as the Respondent, argued that there was an "inherent
flexibility" in the UNCITRAIL Rules that granted the Tribunal discretion to
allow the submissions of briefs, and neither the UNCITRAL rules nor
NAFTA prohibited the Tribunal from considering submissions of non-
disputing parties.' 54 The United States indicated public participation in this
case was important because a State was involved as the Respondent.' 55 Here,
unlike commercial arbitration, the Tribunal was responsible for interpreting
principles of public international law, and the decision of the Tribunal would
affect more actors than the disputing parties in the case. 156
The Tribunal agreed with the United States that no provision of the
UNCITRAL Rules or NAFTA expressly forbade or expressly allowed the
submissions of non-disputing parties; therefore, the Tribunal considered the
question under its general procedural powers according to the UNCITRAL
Rules.' 57 Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules grants the Tribunal broad
discretion in determining how to conduct the arbitration; the Tribunal noted,
however, that it did not have the power to grant the petitioners the right to
'
5 0 Id. at para. 8.
15 Id. at para. 3.
15 2 Id. at para. 12-13.
15 3 Id at para. 14.
154 Metbanex Amnicus Decision, supra note 145, at paras. 17, 19.
15 5 Id. at para. 17.
'
5 7 Id. at para. 24.
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engage in the arbitration as parties, nor could the Tribunal grant the
petitioners any substantive rights.' 58 The Tribunal did state that allowing the
petitioners to submit amicus curiae briefs would not affect the substantive
rights of either of the disputing parties.' 59 The Tribunal concluded that it had
the power to consider submissions of the petitioners under Article 15(1)
because of the general public importance and implications of the
expropriation challenge to a state law. Interestingly, the Tribunal also noted
that allowing submissions would be likely to benefit the arbitral process by
opening the process to the non-disputing parties and increasing its
transparency.'16 0 The notion of increasing the transparency and procedural
legitimacy of the investment arbitration process was included in the United
States and Canada's submissions regarding the petition to file amicus
briefs. 16 1
2. The Procedural Order Allowing Amici Participation in Biwater
Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania
There were five parties that sought to file amicus briefs in Biwater:
(1) The Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT), (2) The Legal and
Human Rights Centre ("LHRC"), (3) The Tanzania Gender Networking
Program (TGNP), (4) The Center for International Environmental Law
(CdEL), and (5) The International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD).162 Procedural Order No. 5 began by listing each party's qualifying
158 Id at para. 27.
159 Methanex Amicus Decision, supra note 145, at para. 3 1. In considering the
question of whether to allow arnicus submissions, the Tribunal looked to an interpretive
note of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal on the interpretation of INCITRAL Rule 15 that
stated, "The arbitral tribunal may ... permit such Government or person to assist the
arbitral tribunal by presenting written and [or] oral statements." Id at para. 32. The
Tribunal in Methanex also compared UNCITRAL Article 15(1) to the WTO rules, and
noted the reluctance of the International Court of Justice to consider amicus briefs. Id at
paras. 33-34.
160 Id at para. 49.
161 Id As to other factors, the Tribunal considered the prejudice to the parties in
allowing the submission (because here the amici would be entering the picture on the side
of the United States to the detriment of the investor) and the increased cost of allowing
the submissions as relevant factors to the decision. The investor's argument that allowing
the submission of briefs here would set an unwieldy precedent for future tribunals was
not persuasive as the arbitration system is not currently bound by precedent, and each
tribunal is tasked with considering the scope of Article 15 in relation to the facts of the
arbitral dispute before it. Id. at paras. 50-5 1.
162 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, Procedural Order
No. 5, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, para. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Biwater
Procedural Order No. 51.
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credentials for participating as amici in the case. 163 The Tribunal noted that
two of the petitioners were the same as the amici in Methanex: IISD and
CIEL.' 4 The petitioners stated that the arbitration, because of its subject
matter, concerned not only the Tanzanian government and City Water, but all
developing countries currently seeking to privatize water services. 165 Indeed,
the petitioners argued that the arbitration between Biwater Gauff and
Tanzania would affect the entire international community because of its
"broader sustainable development" implications and because the
privatization of water services in Tanzania was one of the goals of the UN
Millennium Declaration.' 66 Before its decision, the Tribunal noted that the
petitioners had a "longstanding, genuine" interest in issues such as these, and
that the petitioners' interests were "supported by their well-recognized
expertise on such issues."1167 In addition to the factors enumerated in Rule 37,
the petitioners argued that the Tribunal should also consider the fact that
these parties had a history of amicus participation with no abuse, and that the
Tribunal should also consider the legitimacy and transparency of the arbitral
process when determining whether to allow the submrissions.168
The claimant-investor, Biwater Gauff, argued that the petitioners'
expertise on the subject was irrelevant to the case; the privatization of water
for purposes of the arbitration only relate to the investor and the host-state. 169
City Water had left Tanzania and was not arbitrating the dispute in order to
return and complete the 'project-it was only seeking compensation.
Therefore, City Water would have no further relation to the project, and
because the amici were concerned with the implementation of the water and
sewage project, their arguments were irrelevant to the arbitration. 170 The
Respondent's argument was less strong; the State noted the expertise of the
parties seeking to file briefs, admitted that it was difficult to know whether
the briefs would assist the Tribunal-a requirement of Rule 37(2)--and also
noted that the petitioners' track record indicated that they would not be
16 3 Id at para. 11.
164 Id.
16 5 Id at para. 12.
166 I.at para. 13. "How international investment agreements, which by and large
share similar structures and substantive content, can be applied to govern foreign
investment in major infrastructure projects is asserted to be of critical concern for the
sustainable development of these countries" 1d. at para. 14.
167 Biwater Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 162, at paras. 23-24.
1681Id. at para. 15.
169 Id. at para. 3 1.
10I.at para. 32. "Policy and political issues do not bear on the factual and legal
issues in this dispute." Id at para. 35.
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disruptive or cause harm to the arbitral process.'17 1
The Tribunal's decision noted first, while the petitioners were petitioning
for amicus curiae "status," there is no general amici "status" in ICSLD
arbitrations and that the determination for allowing submissions had to be
made on an ad hoc basis.' 72 The Tribunal then decided that the petitioners
here fell within the three requirements of Rule 37-the submission must
assist the Tribunal, be within the scope of the dispute, and the groups writing
the submission must have "specialized knowledge" on the subject-and
adopted language from the procedural order in Met hanex. In adopting
language from Methanex, the Tribunal stated:
The public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject-matter, as
powerfully suggested in the Petitions. There is also a broader argument, as
suggested by the Respondents and Canada: the ... arbitral process could
benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent; or conversely be
harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal's willingness
to receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this
arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do positive
harm. 173
The Tribunal then noted the same concerns as the Methanex Tribunal:
the cost of the arbitration would be raised by allowing written submissions of
amici, and the allowance of submissions would prejudice the claimant-
investor in this case, as the submissions would favor the Respondent
Tanzania.' 74 Because of these competing concerns, the Tribunal decided a
two-stage process would help the balance of the submissions: (1) the
petitioners were to file a joint brief, and then each disputing party was to
consider whether it would respond to the amicus brief and discuss their idea
with the other party, then (2) after the Tribunal consulted with the parties on
the submissions, it was to issue procedural orders allowing for responses to
171 Id at paras. 42-44.
172 Biwater Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 162, at para. 46. The Tribunal noted
that the ICSID rules only allow for two "carefully delimited" rights: the right to file a
written submission and the right to attend hearings according to Rule 32(2). The Tribunal
did not wish to foster a misconception that the granting of a petitioner to submit amicus
curiae briefs automatically encompassed the right to attend hearings and be able to view
the documents of the parties. Id at para. 46.
17 3 Id. at para. 5 1. The Tribunal also quoted again from the Methanex procedural
order allowing amicus submissions: "the acceptance of amicus submissions would have
the additional desirable consequence of increasing the transparency of investor state
arbitration." Methanex Amicus Decision, supra note 145, at para. 49.
174 Biwater Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 162, at paras. 57-60.
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the amicus submissions if the parties choose to do So. 175
C. The Amicus Briefs and the Final Awards of the Tribunals
1. The Briefs and Final Award in Methanex Corp. v. United States
There were two briefs filed by environmental organizations in Met hanex
Corp. v. United States. The first brief was written by EarthJustice for itself,
Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better Environment, and The Center
For International Environmental Law. The joint brief began its arguments,
after indicating that it agreed with the arguments of the United States, by
asserting that the Tribunal should apply customary principles of international
law in making its decision.'176 There were several supporting bases for the
use of international legal principles: NAFTA indicates that the Tribunal
should be guided by principles of international law, and Methanex repeatedly
relied on international legal principles in making its arguments.' 77 The non-
disputing parties in the joint brief averred that the Tribunal should take
account of the presumption of legitimacy.178 Not only did the principle of
legitimacy apply, the joint brief stated, but the Tribunal should apply a
"4special" presumption of legitimacy in this case because NAFTA and the
North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation ("NAAEC")
"4explicitly preserve the right of each Party government to protect the
environment." 179
The joint brief argued that the precautionary principle-which is widely
accepted in international law-should be applied here because California not
only has the right to protect its citizens' drinking water, it has a duty to do so
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 18 0
'
7 5 Id. at para. 60.
17 6 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Submission of Non-Disputing Parties,
Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better Environment, and Center for International
Environmental Law, para. 2 (NAFTA Ch. 11I Arb. Trib. 2004) [hereinafter Methanex
Bluewater Submission].
178 This principle presumes that a law enacted for justifiable reasons on the basis of
a genuine and proper governmental purpose-such as the health and safety of its
citizens-is legitimate. G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under
International Law, 38 BarMSH YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 307, 338 (1962).
1 79 Methanex Bluewater Submission, supra note 176, at para. 6.
180 The precautionary principle allows a government to regulate an activity that is
possibly or probably harming the environment, even if the government does not have
definitive evidence on the matter. Science and Environmental Health Network,
http://www.sehn.orgfppfaqs.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). "It must [] be up to the
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Finally, the joint brief indicated that the Tribunal should take account of the
principles of subsidiarity and of public participation.'18' Because the
California legislature enacted the now-challenged state law banning MTBE
pursuant to the voice of the people, the Tribunal should give that law due
deference. 182
Other arguments in this joint brief revolve around the idea of the "least
restrictive trade" requirement under the WTO.183 Methanex argued here that
the "least restrictive trade" requirement embodied in the WTO should inform
the Tribunal's definition of discrimination under NAFTA. The brief says, in
comparing NAFTA to the WTO, that:
[I~nvestment disciplines implicate much broader range of government
regulation and thus require a broad focus in identifyring the criteria relevant
to determine illegitimate discrimination. A narrow analysis that looks only
at economic competition would ignore circumstances that explain the need
for health and environmental measures and that are therefore relevant to
determining legitimate intent.'18 4
The International Institute for Sustainable Development also filed a brief
in Methanex. The IISD brief starts off by noting two preliminary issues: first,
that investor-state arbitration is not meant to be an insurance policy for
investors in foreign countries, and second, that investors are presumed to be
"intelligent and aware" of the environment they are investing in. 18 5 Here, this
means that Methanex should have recognized California as a global leader in
environmental regulation, and that the political culture of the United States in
general may foster new, not-completely-foreseen legislation.' 8 6 The IISD
brief went on to argue for the United States under the principles of
international law and national sovereignty, similar to the joint brief.
government, not an international tribunal, to make any judgments required by the
existence of conflicting evidence or different scientific principles." Methanex Bluewater
Submission, supra note 176, at para. 15.
181 The principle of subsidiarity is generally accepted in both international law and
European Union law. Subsidiarity provides that "environmental issues are best addressed
at the lowest level of government." Methanex Bluewater Submission, supra note 176, at
para. 19. The principle of public participation facilitates the involvement of interested
parties, or stakeholders, in making a decision.
182 Id. at para. 20.
183 Id at para. 28.
184 Id at para. 3 1.
185 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Submission of Non-Disputing Party
International Institute for Sustainable Development paras. 3-4 (NAFTA Ch. I11 Arb.
Trib. 2004) [hereinafter Methanex Sustainable Development Submission].
16I.at paras. 5--6.
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IISD then focused specifically on the text of NAFTA and whether
NAFTA's provisions allowed Methanex to argue that the law passed by
California was an illegitimately protectionist measure.' 87 International law
does not, IISD argued, specifically make protectionism illegal.' 88 The
abstract idea of "garden variety" protectionism does not exist as a legal
principle and therefore was not sufficient for Methanex's claim of
discrimination.'189 Methanex argued that the definition of "like
circumstances" under NAFTA Article 1102 should have a similar meaning to
the definition of "like products" in the WTO agreement. In response to
Methanex's argument,' 90 IISD noted that the rules for "like products" were
established using general principles like risk assessment, risk management,
and the precautionary principle.'19 ' IISD could find no evidence that NAFTA
was intended to treat foreign investors better than domestic investors, and in
this case, the "like circumstances" language from Section 1102 of NAFTA
was satisfied because all producers of methanol would be treated the same
under the new California law.
The Tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. United States began its conclusion
regarding the scientific findings that formed the basis for the California law
with a note of deference to the California legislature. The Tribunal indicated
that California had the right to determine how to evaluate risk and allocate
appropriate margins of safety for clean drinking water.192 While scientists
did not uniformly accept the report issued by The University of California
and used by the California legislature as evidence of the damaging effects of
MTBE, the report was subject to peer review and publication.' 93 The
187 Id at paras. 12-17.
188 Id at para. 12.
189 Id at para. 15.
19 0 NAFTA, supra note 77, at art. 1102; Methanex Final Award, supra note 108, pt.
IV, ch. B, at paras. 3-7.
19 Methanex Sustainable Development Submission, supra note 185, at para. 19.
This portion of the brief included a fairly complicated argument about the application of
the environmental exception embodied in the WTrO and its relation to NAFTA. Only
when a complaining state establishes that a state has breached a WTO rule does the
environmental exception apply. The exception does not apply to NAFTA Chapter 11,
furthermore, because it only relates to disputes between two states. The brief averred that
Chapter I I of NAFTA is a "largely self-contained" set of rules that deal with investor-
state relations. Id. at para. 21. See also William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and
Democracy, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 19-38 (1985).
192 Methanex. Final Award, supra note 108, pt. III, ch. B, at para. 44.
193 Id pt. III, ch. A, at para. 10 1. A University of California report noted that several
municipalities in the state had to shut down their public drinking water because of the
MTBE leakage. This study then caught the attention of the California legislature, which
directed researchers to consider whether MTBE had contaminated other areas' drinking
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Tribunal likely framed its decision in this way in light of Methanex's
arguments that it should be entitled to compensation. This level of deference
given by the Tribunal to the scientific findings of the committee no doubt
relates to California's duty to regulate clean water under the ICCPR, the
precautionary principle, and other principles of international law mentioned
in the joint amicus brief.
The Tribunal then indicated the methodology that Methanex wanted it to
adopt in this case was a "connect-the-dots" methodology. The Tribunal noted
"'six dots" in Methanex's chain of inferences: (1) that California was "trying
[] without success" to develop an in-state ethanol industry;' 94 (2) that the
allegations of MTBE leaking into California's groundwater were merely a
pretense to allow California to favor the ethanol industry over MTBE
producers;' 95 (3) California's discriminatory intent was indicated by the fact
that the decision to make MTBE illegally favored ethanol and by ADM's
support of the ban;' 96 (4) the United States allowed political contributions by
corporations, here ADM, to government officials, but did not allow campaign
contributions to be exchanged for a particular government action;' 97
(5) ADM had a dinner meeting at its headquarters for Governor Gray Davis,
which evinces an intent to favor the ethanol industry;' 98 (6) as evidence of
discriminatory intent, Methanex produced evidence by its Director of
Government and Industry Relations that a lobbyist had told him that a
California Senator had made a remark "if you're here on an MTBE issue,
you're [meaning out of luck]."' 99 These "dots" were not enough to allow the
Tribunal to conclude that there was a discriminatory intent present in this
water. These researchers were supposed to include public policy recommendations in
their report as well as cost benefit analysis after assessing the scientific data. The study
that resulted from this research was the Health and Environmental Assessment of MTBE:
Report to the Governor and Legislature of the State of California as sponsored by
SB 521. This is the study the Tribunal is referring to in its report. Dougherty, supra note
101, at 738.
194~ Methanex Final Award, supra note 108, pt. HII, ch. B, at para. 4.
19 Id pt. III, ch. B, at paras. 9-14.
'
96 Id. pt. III, ch. B, at paras. 13-16
197 See id pt. III, ch. B, at paras. 17-33.
'
981Id. pt. 111, chi. B, at paras. 34-46. The Tribunal and both disputing parties agreed
that if Methanex could establish a "quid pro quo" exchange of campaign contributions for
the banning of MTBE it would constitute a violation of United States campaign finance
law. Methanex was unable to offer any evidence to that fact, nor was there evidence that
the banning of MTBE or methanol was discussed at this dinner. The tribunal was
unwilling to infer discrimination in light of the campaign contributions. Id. pt. III, ch. B,
at para. 37.
'
99 Id. pt. III, ch. B, at para. 47 (alteration in original).
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case.200 Because the economic interests of foreign investors had previously
been elevated under NAFTA "to the same plan as the public policy concerns
that drive environmental regulation," Methanex narrows the reach of the
doctrine of expropriation under international investment law and gives States
room to maneuver within their regulatory authority.20'
2. The Briefs and Final Award in Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania
Amici were granted the right to file briefs in Biwater according to
Procedural Order No. 5 and pursuant to the newly amended ICSID
Rule 37(2).202 The amici, however, were unable to obtain access to the
documents involved in the arbitration, including the legal arguments of the
parties. 203 Because of this, the amici discerned the legal arguments of the
parties as best they could from public documents and made arguments they
thought would be relevant.204 The amicus brief in Biwater starts out arguing,
similarly to the brief in Methanex, that bilateral investment treaties are not
insurance policies against bad investments, and that investors are considered
responsible for knowing the environment in which they are investing.205
After noting more specific investor responsibilities-such as the duty to
conduct proper due diligence and risk assessment-the brief implicates the
principle of pacta sunt servanda.206 The amici note that good faith in
contract is absolutely necessary in this context, because when a private actor
fails to comply with the good faith principle in a contract involving an
2 00 Methanex Final Award, supra note 108, pt. HII, ch. B, at para. 52. The Tribunal
indicated that it would have been able to accept Methanex's argument if "(i) [these dots]
were .. , the only dots, (ii) they were to be accepted at face value as submitted by
Methanex; and, moreover, (iii) they were carefully connected as Methanex proposes." Id
201 Id pt. III, ch. B, at para. 52.
202 See Caruba, supra note 98, at 142.
203 Brief of Amici, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22 at para. 12 [hereinafter Biwater Amici Briefj;
Biwater Award, supra note 6, at para. 143.
204 Biwater Amnici Brief, supra note 203, at para. 14.
205 Id. at paras. 16-17 (citing Caffeine v. Spain and MTD v. Chile). The amici also
cite to a decision of the International Court of Justice (1C0), Case Concerning Electronic
Sicula S.P.A. and an article by Prof. Peter Muchlinski, that recognizes the principle of
investor responsibility, and in the latter, that the principle is emerging as part of
international investment law. Id at paras. 20, 23.
26I.at para. 32. Pacta Sunt Servanda is a longstanding principle of good faith in
contract: promises must be kept. Caruba, supra note 98, at 138. The fact that the amici
are using this principle here is interesting because it is normally the investor who argues
pacta sunt servanda should apply, and the country argues based on the principle of rebus
sic stantibus, that circumstances change. Id
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international investment the private actor does not only harm the other
contracting party, it harms the public.207 The principle of pacta sunt
servanda remained, according to the amici, "the most critical bulwark against
such a result."1208
The brief moves on to address the recognition of the "urgency of water
access needs.. . in the developing world" from the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in 2002.209 The private sector was involved in this
summit, according to the amici, and the claimant-investor here, Biwater, had
explicitly acknowledged the need for safe drinkcing water in developing
countries.210 The amici also note that the right to clean drinking water has
been accepted in international law as a basic human rgh"1 "Amici submit
that human rights and sustainable development issues must be factors that
condition the nature and extent of the investor's responsibilities, and the
balance of rights and obligations between the investor and host state."212 The
brief applies these legal principles to the investor in the case by submitting
that Biwater failed in its legal obligations as an investor.213
In its conclusion, the brief then argues that the "connect-the-dots"
methodology that was used in Met hanex-by the claimant against the
State-should be applied against the investor here. The amici's legal theory
was that Biwater was strategically bidding low on the contracts so as to be
able to renegotiate later. This strategy could be found by connecting several
of the dots of Biwater's actions. Two of the dots included a failure to
properly conduct due diligence and a renegotiation beginning only sixteen
months after the original contract was entered into.214 There was no other
plausible way to explain the combination of facts about the company's
actions here, the amici argued, other than that it was employing a
renegotiation strategy.215 "Indeed, it is hard to conceive of another business
rationale that would explain this combination of factors." 216
The Tribunal described the arguments of the amici in its Final Award and
noted that the submissions were helpful. Biwater Gauff argued that Tanzania
had expropriated its investment in the action taken by the government when
207 Biwater Amnici Brief, supra note 203, at para. 33.
208 Id.
209 I.at para. 45.
2 10 I.at pama. 46-47.
211 Id at para. 48.
2 12 Id at para. 5 1.
213 Biwater Amicd Brief, supra note 203, at para. 54.
2 14 Id at para. 84.
215 Id at pama. 86.
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the ]Lease Contract was failing.217 The arguments of BGT amounted to a
"'6creeping' expropriation" challenge.218 The challenge was brought under
Article 5 of the BIT between the UK and Tanzania.219 In evaluating the
expropriation claims, the Tribunal noted that other tribunals in similar cases
have examined the government action based on the effects the action had on
the investor.220 The Tribunal stated, however, that "there is nothing to require
such effects be economic in nature." 221 The Tribunal concluded on the
expropriation issue that the right of Biwater as delineated in the lease
contract had been expropriated. The initial claims of Biwater relating to the
performance of the lease contract did not amount to an expropriation;
however, the press release issued by Minister Lowassa and followed by a
political rally amounted to an expropriation because the acts involved the
State exercising its administrative authority. 222 The other actions were
merely contract terminations, which do not rise to the level of a breach of
international law.223 The Tribunal agreed that Tanzania had violated the
rights of the Biwater to be free from expropriation. It refused, however, to
grant the corporation any damnages. 224 Both parties consented to the
217 Biwater Award, supra note 6, at para. 399.
2 18 Id. at para. 456.
219 Article 5 of the BIT between the UK and Tanzania states that investments shall
not be "nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to
nationalisation or expropriation ... in the territory of the other Contracting Party except
for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party on a non-discriminatory
basis and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation ... Id at para. 394.
20I.at para. 463.
221 Id at para. 464. "A distinction must be drawn between (a) interference with
rights and (b) economic loss. A substantial interference with rights may well occur
without actually causing any economic damage which can be quantified in terms of due
compensation. In other words, the fact that the effect of conduct must be considered in
deciding whether an indirect expropriation has occurred, does not necessarily import an
economic test." Id (emphasis omitted).
222 Id. at paras. 497-98.
223 See SUBEDI, supra note 58, at 76.
224 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (U.K.) v. United Republic of Tanzania,
Introductory Note to Three Procedural Orders, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22
(2008) (on file with author). Not only did the Tribunal in this case refuse to grant
damages to the corporation, but the government of Tanzania actually received a damages
award due to the decision to privatize from an UNCITRAL Tribunal in January of 2008.
Id Because the corporation was in liquidation at the time this Note was written, however,
it is unclear whether the government of Tanzania and the authorities of Dar es Salaam
will ever receive any of the 3M GBP.
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publication of the final award, but the legal documents and arguments of the
parties have not been released. 225
V. CONCLUSION: 14ARNESSING AND ExPANDING THE RIGHT OF
PARTICIPATION
This student seeks to comparatively analyze Met hanex and Biwater
based on (1) the state actions challenged as expropriations, (2) the legal basis
for the submissions of the amicus brief and each Tribunal's reasoning for
allowing the submissions, and (3) the arguments of the amici. While the right
for groups with specialized knowledge to publicly participate in ICSID is
certainly an improvement in the transparency of transnational arbitration,
there may be ways to further adapt the system to the changing regulatory
structure in the world. As disaggregated networks form, the transnational
arbitration system may be able to engage the networks as participants in the
process, using Rule 37 as the crack to explore this possibility. Because the
state in transnational arbitration has international legal obligations while the
investor does not, the transnational arbitration process is asymmetrical in
nature. This Note analyzes the procedure, briefs, and final awards in
Methanex and Biwater for the possibility of equal obligations on the part of
all tbree parties: the state, the investor, and the amici.
A. The California Law and the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage
Services Project
Methanex and Biwater demonstrate similar expropriation challenges to
two diametric forms of regulation. Methanex involved a regulation passed by
the State of California, The MTBE Public Health and Environment
Protection Act of 1997, initially brought about by Executive Order. The
passing of the MTBE Public Health and Environment Protection Act sought
to regulate the use of MTBE in gasoline, thus making the industrial actor in
the case the subject of the regulation. Methanex is, therefore, an example of a
traditional regulation challenged by the private actor.
Biwater involved an entirely different situation; the action challenged in
Biwater can be viewed through the lens of new governance regulation for
several reasons. First, the Tanzanian law evolved from a centralized national
authority in charge of water services to decentralized, regional authorities
that had to charge for water and sewage services. Second, the involvement of
private actors in the process was central to the Tanzanian reform as private
actors were allowed to bid on the contract and implement the project.
Biwater Gauff, as a stakeholder, had to implement the crucially important
225 Biwater Award, supra note 6, at para. 477.
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task of providing water services. Finally, the participation of the
organizations providing funds for water services improvement in Tanzania-
the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European
Investment Bank-rounded out the stakeholders in the action to include not
only government and private actors, but also international organizations. As
discussed above, the task of remedying the precarious situation of water
services in Dar es Salaam was severely difficult, and the private stakeholders
in the action failed to execute the contract as planned. The actions taken by
the government, then, were in response to this failure.
The key difference to note between Methanex and Biwater is the action
taken by each government after the law was passed, in Methanex, or the
project was implemented, in Biwater. The United States, through the State of
California, passed the MTBE Public Health and Environment Protection Act
legitimately under its sovereign authority. After passing the law, the state of
California did not have to take any further action. When Methanex brought
the expropriation claim, both the presumption of legitimacy and public
participation protected the United States, as a representative of California,
throughout the course of the arbitration. Thus, the Tribunal decided on the
merits that the United States had not expropriated Methanex's investment.
The public outcry relating to the expropriation claim was due to Methanex
challenging the MTBE Act. Once California had passed the Act, it did not
have to take any further action to remedy what it saw as a public policy
problem-the use of a dangerous chemical in gasoline.
Conversely, when the project in Tanzania began to fail because the
private actors had been entrusted with too ambitious of a project and were
not keeping their end of the bargain, the Tanzanian government was forced to
take action. The situation that evolved in Biwater, then, encompassed public
outcry at the private stakeholders and required the government to take action
to correct the problem. This government action was the subject of the
expropriation challenge after the corporation had failed in implementing the
project. The Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Infrastructure project
demonstrates that new governance forms of regulation may breed a new
brand of expropriation challenges in the future. When private stakeholders
fail, the public outcry against the project will require the government to take
action, as the government is accountable to its citizens while the private actor
is not. In light of current expropriation doctrine-and according to Biwater-
the actions taken by the government in exercising its executive authority may
amount to an expropriation challenge. This result is particularly harsh in the
context of a country like Tanzania that, according to the amici, has been
struggling with providing water services for decades and was implementing a
plan in accordance with the UN Millennium Declaration.
In order to maintain flexibility to be able to adapt to the "New World
Order," the transnational arbitration mechanism must continue its
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engagement of the public interest through Rule 37 while adapting to perhaps
allow the participation of cross-border networks in the arbitration. For
example, the co-operative international agreement for the enforcement of
environmental laws between the three NAFTA countries could participate in
an arbitral dispute between investors arising out of NAiFTA. This would be a
way to expand the use of Rule 3 7(2) by including a party that has unique
expertise on the subject, and that has been cooperating on enforcement of a
specific treaty. Furthermore, allowing a cooperative network to participate as
an amici would, in this example, include actors from all three NAFTA
countries in the arbitral process. Broadening the type of actors who
participate in the arbitral process would, perhaps, lessen the prejudice of
written submissions against the investor.
B. The Use of the Arbitration Mechanism to Allow Public
Participation
In amending the ICSID Convention rules to allow groups with
"specialized knowledge" to participate in investor-state arbitrations, the
ICSID rules grant parties the right to participate in cases involving the public
interest. The procedural orders in each case stated that the public interest was
undoubtedly present because of the right of individuals to have access to
clean drinking water free from polluting toxins and clean sewage systems.226
The Tribunal in Methanex, however, had to grapple with the question of
whether it had the power to consider submissions of the petitioners at all.22 7
The struggle of the Tribunal in Met hanex involved examining a broad
procedural right with no express statement forbidding or allowing the
participation. The Tribunal allowing the amicus submissions did so
completely of its own accord, based upon public outcry over the challenge to
the California law. The procedural order in Biwater demonstrated the power
Rule 37 grants a tribunal to allow public participation. 228 The Tribunal in
Biwater did not have to engage in an analysis of its own authority to allow
written submissions by non-disputing parties; it simply plugged in Rule 37
and weighed the factors enumerated in the rule. 229
Interestingly, both procedural orders relied, perhaps heavily, on the
appearance of legitimacy in the arbitral process.230 The Tribunal examined
226 Biwater Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 162, at paras. 12-13; Methanex
Arnicus Decision, supra note 145, at para. 3 1.
227 Methanex Amnicus Decision, supra note 145, at para. 24.
228 See Biwater Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 162, at paras. 50-6 1.
229 See id
230 See id at para. 51 (quoting Methanex Amnicus Decision, supra note 145, at
para. 49).
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each of the three conditions required by Rule 37 before the Tribunal could
allow the submission of amicus briefs. Those three factors are: (1) the
petitioners must have "specialized knowledge" related to the dispute that
would "assist" the Tribunal in coming to a decision, (2) the amicus
submissions must address a matter within the scope of the dispute and (3) the
petitioners seeking to file submissions must have a "significant interest" in
the dispute.23' The Tribunal in Procedural Order No. 5, in Biwater, listed the
petitioners' qualifications and found that the petitioners had the "specialized
knowledge" required by Rule 37 to file written submissions.232 The
qualifications listed were also a basis for the Tribunal to decide that the
parties had a "significant interest in the proceeding." 233 The other two factors
were, however, more difficult for the Tribunal to discern at the time the
petitioners filed their request to submit amicus briefs. Whether the petitioners
would assist the Tribunal with their submissions, and whether the petitioners
would address a matter within the scope of the dispute were unknown. The
Tribunal relied on the previous participation of the petitioners in determining
that they would not "disrupt the proceeding" under the last sentence of Rule
37(2).234 The Tribunal also had to consider the additional cost in allowing the
submissions-renting the ICSID arbitration facilities costs $3000 per day-
and the possible prejudice to the investor.
Because several of the factors enumerated in Rule 37(2) could not be
evaluated by the Tribunal at the time of its procedural order, the decision to
allow the written submissions seemed to rest on the other two factors. The
petitioners argued that amicus participation is now the norm in investment
treaty arbitration cases involving the public interest, and not allowing the
submissions would contribute to further challenges to the legitimacy of the
investment treaty arbitration process. In response to these arguments, the
Tribunal adopted the language of Methanex in allowing the submissions. The
language in Met hanex was, obviously, written before the existence of
Rule 37(2), and involved an expropriation challenge under NAFTA-instead
of a BIT-and the IJNCITRAL arbitration rules.
The primary value of Rule 37(2), therefore, in determining whether to
allow written submissions by non-disputing parties is its place in the ICSID
arbitration rules. Expressly granting the tribunal the discretion to allow the
submissions shields the tribunal from having to ask whether the allowance of
written submissions is within its power. The factors that will influence the
tribunal's decision, however, in deciding whether to allow the submissions,
231 ICSID Convention Rules, supra note 20, at Rule 37(2).
232 Biwater Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 162, at para. 50.
233 Id.; ICSID Convention Rules, supra note 20, at Rule 37(2)(c).
234 ICSID Convention Rules, supra note 20, at Rule 37(2).
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still seem to rest on the public outcry surrounding the expropriation claim
and the appearance of legitimacy in the arbitration. These factors are not
enumerated in Rule 3 7(2), but the Tribunal in Biwater allowed their
consideration by deciding that the list of factors in Rule 37(2) was not
exhaustive. The focus on the appearance of legitimacy is troubling, as
allowing the briefs may appease the public, but does not require the tribunal
to consider the briefs in making its decision. This, however, is the challenge
of all procedural improvements to legal systems. The outcome of the process
is perhaps affected and perhaps not. Here, there is no way to know for sure if
the submissions of the amici had any effect on the Tribunal.
C. The Arguments of the Amici and the Final Awards on the Merits
The briefs in Met hanex focused their arguments on recognized
international law principles traditionally given to states exercising their
sovereign authority: the principle of legitimacy, public participation, and the
precautionary principle. These arguments were relevant as the expropriation
challenge was to a California law. In Biwater, however, the briefs differed
from the Methanex arguments and were reversed from the norm. The amici
implicated the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that promises must be kept
in arguing that the claimant-investor in the case failed to uphold its contract
responsibilities. In traditional cases, the investor argues the principle of pacta
sunt servanda, while the state argues rec sic stantibus, that circumstances
change. When the expropriation claim is brought to challenge a new
governance action, however, the arguments are reversed.
The expropriation challenge to the new governance action then leaves the
state and investor with asymmetrical responsibilities: both parties are
required to comply with the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rec sic
stantibus. The state has dual obligations, however, both as a contracting party
constrained by contract principles and as a sovereign nation. Only the state's
actions may amount to both a breach of a contract obligation and an
expropriation action.235 For example, an ICSID Tribunal in Waste
Management v. Mexico noted that "[a] failing enterprise is not expropriated
just because the debts are not paid or other contractual obligations are not
fulfilled."1236 However, the Tribunal in Biwater stated that the absence of
235 The contract breaches in Biwater were governed by another arbitration under the
UNCITRAL Rules. This arbitration granted the Republic damages due to the investor's
breach of its obligations. The ICSID Tribunal in Biwater noted that the contract breach
was evidence of expropriation, but was not dispositive of the issue. Biwater Award, supra
note 6, at para. 470. "IIIln determining the treaty claims as between BGT and the
Republic, it is impossible to disregard the way in which the Lease Contract was
concluded, performed, renegotiated, and terminated." Id
236 I.at para. 432 (quoting Waste Management v. Mexico).
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economic damage does not mean that the State had not expropriated the
investment.
In the Biwater challenge, then, the decision rested on the fact that the
investor had not been damaged by the expropriation. Because a state has
responsibility for any "internationally wrongful act"--defined as "an act or
omission which is attributable to the State under international law and a
breach of an international obligation of the State" -the state is required to
make reparations for injury caused.237 When the state causes an
expropriation, , the state must pay the investor "restitutionary damages." 238
In order for the state to be required to pay those damages, there must be a
sufficient causal link between the state's action and the damages suffered by
the investor.239 The Tribunal in Biwater concluded that, by the time Tanzania
took the actions that amounted to expropriation, the economic value of the
investment in the project had already deteriorated, and therefore, that the
Republic's expropriatory actions did not cause any damage to Biwater.240
The only appropriate remedy, then, for the State's conduct was "declaratory
in nature."1241
The Final Award in Biwater is important in relation to the amnicus briefs
in three ways. First, the expropriation decision does not mention the amnici's
"connect the dots" theory borrowed from the Final Award in Methanex.
Second, the amicus briefs in both cases, Methanex and Biwater, began by
arguing that the principle of investor responsibility is becoming a customary
principle in international law. Finally, the asymmetrical expropriation
decision demonstrates the difficulty tribunals will have deciding disputes
challenging new governance actions. The "connect the dots" theory argued
by the investor in Methanex and used by the amici in Biwater represents the
thread of consistency brought to the arbitral process by the allowance of
written submissions in cases involving the public interest, a thread further
evinced by the arguments in both briefs that the principle of investor
responsibility is an emerging concept in international law.
Notably, the Tribunal in Biwater did not accept the "connect the dots"
methodology offered by the amnici to parallel the argument by the investors in
Methanex. The Tribunal noted that the amici's arguments were helpful and
informed its analysis, but did not indicate that the amici' s arguments
succeeded in any particular place in the Final Award. Because the amnici were
not allowed access to the documents in Biwater, they were forced to create
237 Id. at para. 773.
238 Id. at paras. 773-74.
239 Id at para. 780.
240 I.at para. 798.
241 Biwater Award, supra note 6, at para. 807.
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an argument based on public documentation. The ICSID rules do not
currently allow amici granted the right to file written submissions access to
documents involving the arbitration. Rule 32 states that the Tribunal may
allow non-disputing parties to be present at the oral hearing; however, either
party may veto and disallow non-disputing parties to witness the oral
hearing.242 Amendments to the ICSID rules are limited by the ICSID
convention, and there still remains a strong presumption of confidentiality in
transnational arbitration.243
This Note argues, however, that private foreign investors should have an
obligation to disclose certain information because of the substantive rights
granted to the investor by the host-state and investor-state's BIT. These rules
could be structured so that the disclosures did not run afoul of corporate
disclosure rules. New governance theories are giving private stakeholders the
ability to participate in the governance and implementation process, while
seeking to. facilitate information sharing and group problem solving. In light
of the additional opportunities for private actors to participate in the
governance process, these actors should have corollary obligations to allow
certain individuals access to certain documents when a dispute arises.
Requiring this disclosure will encourage symmetry of all three parties in
tranisnational arbitration: the state, the investor, and the non-disputing party.
Finally, amici are able to bring new principles of law to the attention of
the arbitral tribunal because of their expertise in the area and their focus on
evolving principles of law. The emerging principle of investor responsibility,
argued by the amici in both cases, will potentially help cure the asymmetry in
expropriation challenges to new governance actions by obliging the investor
to act in a certain way. The investor's obligations to act in accordance with
the principle of investor responsibility may parallel the obligation the state
has to not expropriate the investment. Recognizing the responsibility of the
investor will allow the state to take action due to public outcry when private
stakeholders are unable to perform the contract duties required of them as a
foreign investor. The state will still have an international obligation to secure
the rights of the investor, thus, the investor will still be protected from
expropriation. The principle of investor responsibility, however, will elevate
the position of the investor to, if not a parallel responsibility, a similar plane.
This emerging principle of customary international law is important in the
context of regulatory evolution.
The transnational arbitration mechanism has experienced new growth
and responded to concerns about transparency through the amendment of the
arbitration rules and, perhaps in the future, the amendment of BITs to contain
provisions protecting a state from challenges to its enacted regulations. The
242 ICSID Convention Rules, supra note 20, at Rule 32.
243 See Franck, supra note 58, at 1537.
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proliferation of the participation of NGOs in the transnational arbitration
system has helped in this transparency as well. It is important to remember,
however, that as non-state actors are increasing their participation in
transnational arbitration, private actors are increasing their participation in
projects that may be challenged on the international plane. This leads to
asymmetry in legal obligations of the investor and host-state, and the legal
principles of international investment law must adapt as more new
governance actions are challenged as expropriations.
